

# AGT 7th tutorial\*

7 December 2023

## 1 Regret minimization (external, internal, swap)

There are  $N$  available actions  $X = \{1, \dots, N\}$  and at each time step  $t$  the online algorithm  $A$  selects a probability distribution  $p^t = (p_1^t, \dots, p_N^t)$  over  $X$ . After the distribution  $p^t$  is chosen at time step  $t$ , the adversary chooses a loss vector  $\ell^t = (\ell_1^t, \dots, \ell_N^t) \in [-1, 1]^N$ , where the number  $\ell_i^t$  is the loss of action  $i$  in time  $t$ . The algorithm  $A$  then experiences loss  $\ell_A^t = \sum_{i=1}^N p_i^t \ell_i^t$ . After  $T$  steps, the loss of action  $i$  is  $L_i^T = \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_i^t$  and the loss of  $A$  is  $L_A^T = \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_A^t$ . The *external regret* of  $A$  is  $R_A^T = \max_{i \in X} \{L_A^T - L_i^T\}$ .

**Exercise 1** (\*). *Prove the following statements about lower bounds for external regret.*

- Let  $N$  and  $T$  be natural numbers such that  $N$  is power of 2 and  $T < \log_2 N$ , then there exists choice of random vectors of losses from  $\{0, 1\}$  such that every online algorithm  $A$  satisfy  $\mathbb{E}[L_A^T] \geq T/2$  and  $L_{min}^T = 0$
- For  $N = 2$ , there exists a choice of random vectors of losses from  $\{0, 1\}$  such that every online algorithm  $A$  satisfy  $\mathbb{E}[L_A^T - L_{min}^T] \geq \Omega(\sqrt{T})$ .

**Exercise 2.** *Let  $A$  be an algorithm with parameter  $\eta \in (0, 1/2]$  and with external regret at most  $\alpha/\eta + \beta\eta T$  for some constants  $\alpha, \beta$  (that may depend on the number  $N$  of actions). We showed that choosing  $\eta = \sqrt{\alpha/(T\beta)}$  minimizes the bound. Modify this algorithm so that we obtain an external regret bound that is at most  $O(1)$ -times larger than the original bound for any  $T$ . In particular, you cannot run  $A$  with a parameter  $\eta$  that depends on  $T$ .*

*Hint: Partition the set  $\{1, \dots, T\}$  into suitable intervals  $I_m$  for  $m = 0, 1, 2, \dots$  and run  $A$  with a suitable parameter  $\eta_m$  in every step from  $I_m$ .*

Given the sequence  $(p^t)_{t=1}^T$  of the probability distributions used by  $A$  and a modification rule  $F$ , we define a *modified sequence*  $(f^t)_{t=1}^T = (F^t(p^t))_{t=1}^T$ , where  $f^t = (f_1^t, \dots, f_N^t)$  and  $f_i^t = \sum_{j: F^t(j)=i} p_j^t$ . The *loss of the modified sequence* is  $L_{A,F}^T = \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N f_i^t \ell_i^t$ . Given a sequence  $\ell^t$  of loss vectors, the *regret of  $A$  with respect to  $\mathcal{F}$*  is  $R_{A,\mathcal{F}}^T = \max_{F \in \mathcal{F}} \{L_A^T - L_{A,F}^T\}$ . The external regret of  $A$  is then  $R_{A,\mathcal{F}^{ex}}^T$  for  $\mathcal{F}^{ex} = \{F_i: i \in X\}$  of  $N$  modification rules  $F_i = (F_i^t)_{t=1}^T$ , where each  $F_i^t$  always outputs action  $i$ . The *internal regret* of  $A$  is  $R_{A,\mathcal{F}^{in}}^T$  for the set  $\mathcal{F}^{in} = \{F_{i,j}: (i,j) \in X \times X, i \neq j\}$  of  $N(N-1)$  modification rules  $F_{i,j} = (F_{i,j}^t)_{t=1}^T$ , where, for every time step  $t$ ,  $F_{i,j}^t(i) = j$  and  $F_{i,j}^t(i') = i'$  for each  $i' \neq i$ . The *swap regret* of  $A$  is  $R_{A,\mathcal{F}^{sw}}^T$  for the set  $\mathcal{F}^{sw}$  of all modification rules  $F: X \rightarrow X$ .

**Exercise 3.** *Show that the swap regret is at most  $N$  times larger than the internal regret.*

**Exercise 4.** *Show an example with  $N = 3$  where the external regret is zero and the swap regret goes to infinity with  $T$ .*

*Clarification: you need to choose only a sequence of actions  $a^1, \dots, a^T$ ,  $a^i \in X = \{1, 2, 3\}$ , and a loss sequence  $\ell_a^1, \dots, \ell_a^T$  for every  $a \in X$ .*

For a normal-form game  $G = (P, A, C)$  of  $n$  players, a probability distribution  $p(a)$  on  $A$  is a *correlated equilibrium* in  $G$  if  $\sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} C_i(a_i; a_{-i}) p(a_i; a_{-i}) \leq \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} C_i(a'_i; a_{-i}) p(a_i; a_{-i})$  for every player  $i \in P$  and all  $a_i, a'_i \in A_i$ . A probability distribution  $p(a)$  on  $A$  is a *coarse correlated equilibrium* in  $G$  if  $\sum_{a \in A} C_i(a) p(a) \leq \sum_{a \in A} C_i(a'_i; a_{-i}) p(a)$  for every player  $i \in P$  and every  $a'_i \in A_i$ .

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\*Informace o cvičení naleznete na <http://kam.mff.cuni.cz/~ryzak/>