## Algorithmic game theory

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# Proof of the Minimax Theorem

#### The Minimax Theorem

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For every zero-sum game, worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist and can be efficiently computed. There is a number *v* such that, for any worst-case optimal strategies *x*<sup>\*</sup> and *y*<sup>\*</sup>, the strategy profile (*x*<sup>\*</sup>, *y*<sup>\*</sup>) is a Nash equilibrium and β(*x*<sup>\*</sup>) = (*x*<sup>\*</sup>)<sup>T</sup>M*y*<sup>\*</sup> = α(*y*<sup>\*</sup>) = *v*.

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Figure: John von Neumann (1903–1957) and Oskar Morgenstern (1902–1977).

Sources: https://en.wikiquote.org and https://austriainusa.org

# Duality of linear programming


# Duality of linear programming

	Primal linear program	Dual linear program
Variables	$x_1,\ldots,x_m$	$y_1,\ldots,y_n$
Matrix	$A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$	$A^{ op} \in \mathbb{R}^{m  imes n}$
Right-hand side	$oldsymbol{b}\in\mathbb{R}^n$	$c \in \mathbb{R}^m$
Objective function	$\max c^{ op} x$	min $b^{\top}y$
Constraints	$i$ th constraint has $\leq$	$y_i \ge 0$
	2	$y_i \leq 0$
	=	$y_i \in \mathbb{R}$
	$x_j \ge 0$	$j$ th constraint has $\geq$
	$x_j \leq 0$	≤
	$x_j \in \mathbb{R}$	=

Table: A recipe for making dual programs.

• We try to design an algorithm for finding Nash equilibria in games of two players (bimatrix games).

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SIMPLY EXPLAINED: BRUTE FORCE ATTACK

Source: https://pinterest.com

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
SIMPLY EXPLAINED: BRUTE FORCE ATTACK

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• Later, we show the currently best known algorithm for this problem.


# Examples of polytopes

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


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Thank you for your attention.