

# Algorithmic game theory

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4th lecture

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# Nash equilibria in bimatrix games

# Best response polyhedra

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$$\overline{P} = \{(x, v) \in \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R} : x \geq \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}^\top x = 1, N^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}v\}.$$

Similarly, the best response polyhedron for player 2 in  $G$  is

$$\overline{Q} = \{(y, u) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R} : y \geq \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}^\top y = 1, My \leq \mathbf{1}u\}.$$

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

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Best response polyhedra  $\overline{P}$  and  $\overline{Q}$  for the Battle of sexes

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



$$\overline{P} = \{(x_1, x_2, v) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R} : x_1, x_2 \geq 0, x_1 + x_2 = 1, x_1 \leq v, 2x_2 \leq v\}$$

$$\overline{Q} = \{(y_3, y_4, u) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R} : y_3, y_4 \geq 0, y_3 + y_4 = 1, 2y_3 \leq u, y_4 \leq u\}.$$

# Best response polytopes $P$ and $Q$ for the Battle of sexes

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



$$P = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2 : x_1, x_2 \geq 0, x_1 \leq 1, 2x_2 \leq 1\}$$

$$Q = \{(y_3, y_4) \in \mathbb{R}^2 : y_3, y_4 \geq 0, 2y_3 \leq 1, y_4 \leq 1\}.$$

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Figure: **Carlton E. Lemke** (1920–2004) and J. T. **Howson** (?).

Source: <https://oldurls.inf.ethz.ch>






Figure: A view on the complexity classes classification.

Source: [https://complexityzoo.uwaterloo.ca/Complexity\\_Zoo](https://complexityzoo.uwaterloo.ca/Complexity_Zoo)




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Thank you for your attention.