Algorithmic game theory

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6th lecture

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Other notions of equilibria

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- Though ε-NE look natural at first sight, there are some drawbacks.
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- Today we will see a new solution concept that can be found efficiently.

Correlated equilibria

- The concept of correlated equilibria was introduced by Robert Aumann, who received a Nobel prize in economics for his work in game theory.



Figure: Robert Aumann (born 1930).

Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org and https://slideslive.com/38910863/strategic-information-theory

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

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

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Thank you for your attention.